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Abstract: 
This paper advances the measurement of nontariff measures (NTMs) by discussing a 
framework for how to compare regulations. We argue that relative differences in SPS 
regulations trigger the impact on trade flows between trading partner countries and 
specifically look at maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides in a case study on 
Chilean fruit exports to the EU. In order to capture the relative differences and 
stringency in tolerance levels of trading partners, a simple indicator is constructed and 
applied in an econometric analysis. In comparison to existing indices of regulatory 
heterogeneity, the depth of information generated by our indicator severely 
compromises its coverage. Further development of our heterogeneity index will need 
to aim at including elements of process standards and conformity assessment 
procedures. 
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1. Introduction 
Advances in the measurement of impact of nontariff measures (NTMs) on trade and 
competitiveness are constrained by the lack of consistent data on regulatory 
differences between countries. In previous studies on the impact assessment of NTMs, 
in particular standards and regulations, various indicators to measure NTMs have 
been applied. In several studies frequency and coverage measures have been used, 
often based on count data from the TRAINS dataset of the UNCTAD. Whereas such 
indicators have many shortcomings, a critical flaw is the lack of information on the 
standards and regulations themselves. Recent contributions to the literature indicate 
that the economic impact of standards and regulations will differ by the type and 
purpose of the measure under review. Korinek, Melatos and Rau (2008) discuss 
different measurement methods and provide an overview of the existing literature. 
The analytical framework developed by OECD (2008) encompasses the costs and 
benefits of regulations and standards in the impact measurement, thereby taking into 
account the purpose of the measures. For useful applications, data on the scope and 
purpose of regulations and standards is necessary.  
Apart from some detailed case studies, few quantification studies take into account the 
substance of regulations and standards but usually the relative differences between 
regulations in the home and export country is not explicitly considered. In 
international trade, NTMs can constitute entry barriers due to the additional costs for 
exporting firms. The key question thus is whether exporters incur additional market 
entry costs, and in this regard differences in regulation between the home regulation 
and the import requirements matter more than the absolute stringency of the 
regulation. A promising tool for expressing the stringency in such relative terms is an 
index of regulatory heterogeneity that measures to what extent relevant regulations in 
country A differ from those in country B. 
This paper presents on-going research that seeks to identify differences in NTMs in 
order to quantify their trade impact. Converting qualitative information of regulatory 
regimes for food safety into appropriate indicators is challenging, and we therefore 
focus on maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides. In our case study, we look at 
pesticide MRLs for exports of fresh fruit from Chile to the European Union (EU). The 
EU-Chile case study is particularly interesting in the context of bilateral trade reform 
and cooperation on standards and regulations. The free trade agreement between the 
EU and Chile contains specific provisions for cooperation on standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment (Annex IV of the EU-Chile Association 
Agreement). Although the agreement promotes the mutual recognition of 
requirements and procedures of dealing with SPS issues in order to avoid and/or 
reduce possible trade impediments for both Chilean and EU agri-food exporters, 
differences can be expected to continue to influence agri-food trade between Chile 
and the EU member states. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, we briefly outline a framework for 
comparing standards and regulations across countries. After some information on fruit 
trade between Chile and the EU, we introduce the case study of pesticide MRLs that 
Chile and the EU respectively impose on a set of selected fruits and construct a 
regulatory heterogeneity index. The index is subsequently applied in an econometric 
model of the Chilean export supply of fruit to the EU15. The paper ends with some 
conclusions on both methodological advances and the policy implications of the 
estimation results. 
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2. Comparing regulations and standards in trade 
The regulatory system to control food safety and health issues consist of various 
elements amongst which requirements, conformity assessment and enforcement 
constitute the basic elements. These basic elements to control food safety are 
embedded in the overall institutional and/or organizational system that stands at the 
top level of the framework of regulations for food safety and other quality aspects. 
While the responsibilities of governmental agencies, private entities and expertise 
may be differently distributed in different countries, the institutional and 
organizational framing of governmental regulations shapes the standard setting, the 
implementation of standards and their enforcement. 
Governmental food safety and quality regulations are formulate in the national food 
law of the respective country. While domestic producers have to meet mandatory 
governmental requirements, governments also demand that foreign products satisfy 
the respective requirements as import conditions. Non-compliance with the 
requirements by the importing country can reduce or entirely block the foreign market 
access, thereby affecting the volume of exports as well as the export destination. The 
regulatory system of food safety and quality is in the first instance a domestic affair, 
often with some kind of international coordination though. In international agri-food 
trade, requirements and conformity assessment however also apply to foreign 
products and are hence considered as non-tariff measures (NTMs). 
Following the new classification of NTMs of the database of the Trade Analysis and 
Information System (TRAINS)1, we differentiate between actual requirements and 
conformity assessment that are specified for SPS regulations on the one hand and 
technical regulations (TBT) on the other hand. While requirements contain both 
product and process standards, conformity assessment relates to the evaluation, 
verification and the assurance of conformity. Conformity assessment requirements 
comprise testing and inspection requirements as well as approval procedures, 
including the accreditation and pre-listing of exporters and/or products allowed to be 
sold on the market of the respective importing country. Quarantine measures ensuring 
that unwanted foreign species and pests are not imported can also be considered as 
some kind of conformity assessment. Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview 
of SPS requirements defined by the new TRAINS classification. We argue that 
differences in standards and regulations determine the trade impact and therefore 
compare standards and regulations in our analysis. 
At the international level, the relation between requirements for domestic and foreign 
products is organised by the WTO trade rules, more precisely the SPS and TBT 
Agreement. While maintaining the sovereign right and obligation of countries to set 
their own standards, countries are encouraged to base their import requirements on 
internationally agreed standards, in the case of food safety for example the standards 
and guidelines developed by the Codex Alimentarius Committee of the World Health 
Organisation2. If measures are used to protect human, animal and plant health in the 
                                                 
1
 A Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) was recently established to improve the TRAINS database of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development that reports the number of notifications of 
NTMs. MAST developed an improved classification of NTMs used for the updating of the TRAINS 
database. 
2
 The Codex Alimentarius refers to food standards, guidelines and codes of practice recommended 
under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. The International Pant Protection Convention 
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importing country and are not misused as disguised protectionist measures in favour 
of domestic producers, the SPS Agreement foresees the possibility of different 
requirements for foreign food products. In order to impose different and possibly 
tighter standards on foreign products importing countries are required to provide 
scientific risk assessments, thereby justifying the necessity of the respective 
requirements. Furthermore, requirements have to be commensurate with their 
objectives and least trade-distorting for achieving the objective aimed at. If the 
aforementioned criteria are fulfilled, importing countries can on the hand uniformly 
impose stricter standards on imports from all exporting countries or require that 
products from different countries satisfy different requirements in order to control for 
export specific risks. In the latter case for example, products from certain countries 
may need to be specifically treated (e.g. irradiation treatments) before importing so as 
to reduce the risk of introducing pests that are endemic in the respective exporting 
countries but not in the importing country. 
Although countries can demand different and possibly tighter standards for foreign 
products according to the SPS Agreement, domestic requirements generally constitute 
the basis for import requirements. Difference in domestic and foreign market 
requirements for agri-food products are due to several reasons: On the one hand, 
standards requirements reflect institutional structures and the national food law, and 
on the other hand, they reflect the prevalent production systems that depend on local 
circumstances (e.g. natural conditions, R&D activities), and consumption traditions 
(e.g. diets, consumer preferences, acceptable risk tolerance levels). Given the 
regulatory differences across trading partner countries, the requirements demanded by 
importing countries can be stricter than those in exporting countries. 
From the producers’ point of view, the requirements for supplying the domestic 
market and foreign export markets matter. That is, exporters have to satisfy the 
requirements of importing countries in order to sell their products on foreign markets. 
Complying with stricter import standards obviously leads to costs for exporters, and 
those exporters that whish to sell their products on different foreign markets tend to 
face even higher costs because they have to comply with several standards according 
to the export destination. To quantify the trade effects of standards, these costs are 
typically approximated but the benefits of standards for producers, for example 
improved production efficiency and higher quality products for which producer can 
usually obtain higher prices, are often neglected. Furthermore it has to be noted that 
trade may not at all take place without standards that reduce the risks of exchanging 
products in general and agri-food products in particular. 
This paper does not elaborate on the costs and benefits of standards in international 
agri-food trade, but for our analysis we argue that the mere difference between the 
standards required for supplying the domestic and foreign market determine the trade 
impact. Our case study specifically looks at pesticide MRLs as import requirements in 
the case of fruit trade between Chile and the EU. 
                                                                                                                                            
(IPPC) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) respectively promote international 
standards and guidelines to prevent the introduction and spread of plant and animal pests.  
 - 5 - 
3. Fruit trade between Chile and the EU: the case of maximum residue levels 
(MRLs) for pesticides 
3.1. Fruit trade between Chile and the EU 
Agri-food trade between the EU and Chile has rapidly expanded since the early 
1990s, up to a total volume of trade of over 2.5 billion euro in 2007. The Chilean 
exports to the EU outstrip the EU export to Chile by a factor of ten. Chile's main 
export products are fresh fruit, other products exported include wine and marine 
products. Fresh fruits exports reveal a combination of expanding volumes and at the 
same time declining importance in the export portfolio. The case study in this paper 
examines whether differences in pesticide MRLs between Chile and the EU explain 
why the growth rates of fruit exports to the EU have lagged behind other agri-food 
exports. 
In 2002, the EU and Chile signed a free trade agreement (FTA), within the framework 
of the EU-Chile Association Agreement. Before the FTA the EU tariffs for Chilean 
products were determined under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Chile, 
which here competes with the North African countries and other Latin American 
countries for market share in the EU export market, received very limited preference 
margins. Under the EU-Chile Association Agreement Chile benefited from 1 January 
2004 onwards of deeper preferences for access to the EU market. In the agreement, 
the EU committed to gradually phase out most tariffs on agricultural imports from 
Chile between 2004 and 2013. In order to allow for adjustment in the sub-sectors most 
sensitive to import competition, the EU phases in tariff eliminations over a maximum 
of 10 years. The mechanisms of the FTA for EU imports of Chilean fruit are to 
eliminate all ad valorem tariffs by 2013, while maintaining the specific tariffs (i.e. 
tariffs expressed on the basis of weight). Complete tariff elimination is phased in 
between 2004, the year the agreement went into force, and 2013 in 4 clusters of tariff 
lines. In fact, the 10-year phase-in time is little used and applies only to oranges in fall 
and winter and for table grapes during the European summer. The earliest elimination 
of tariffs, by 2004, applied to nuts, off-season oranges, off-season apples, raisins, 
melons, and most preserved fruits.3 The seasonal schedule of import duties is 
designed to protect European producers from import competition during harvest 
season. It is much less a factor for competitors in southern hemisphere countries.  
Apart from a possible seasonal variation in the import tariff, the EU maintains an 
entry price system to reduce import competition during the European harvest season 
for fruit. The entry-price system in the EU consists of a reference price established by 
the European Commission and an payable levy on the difference between the price of 
the shipment and the reference price. The levy has a seasonal variation; it is highest in 
the European harvest time and lowest in the off-season. The system eligibly has little 
impact on exports to the EU from tropical countries and countries in the southern 
hemisphere. Using tariff data (including ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs) 
from the TRAINS database, accessed via WITS, EU import tariffs are analyzed for 
selected fruit products for the years 1996-2007. The FTA has substantially brought 
import tariffs for Chilean fruit down from rates between 10 and 15 percent in the late 
1990s to less than 5 percent, e.g. for apples, and to duty-free access, for example for 
grapes (albeit with quota), cherries and plums. 
                                                 
3
 The schedule for elimination is described in the annexes of the Association Agreement 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/euchlagr_en.htm). 
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3.2. Heterogeneity of pesticide MRLs 
Based on good agricultural practice on the one hand and on consumer intake and risk 
assessment on the other hand, MRLs define the maximum legal level of concentration 
for an active substance/pesticide in or on agri-food products. Hence MRLs are not 
maximum toxicological limits but rather the lowest maximum levels of contaminants, 
which can be reasonably achieved with good agricultural practices (van der Meulen 
and van der Velde, 2004). Next to prevalent production methods, research in plant 
protection measures and other factors, climatic conditions that favor different pests 
and legitimate the application of pesticides against them crucially determine which 
pesticides are applied and consequently regulated. Not all pesticides available on the 
market are equally used in countries. Furthermore, if toxicological concerns are high 
and/or alternatives protection methods are available pesticides can be entirely 
prohibited. 
Although pesticide MRLs are measured in numerical elements and can thus be ranked 
on an objective scale, comparing them bears some challenges. First, the list of 
pesticide/active substances regulated can be very long and also includes those active 
substances that do not have a major effect on production. Second, different countries 
do not necessarily regulate the same pesticides, and as mentioned above, separate 
tolerance levels for imported products may have been established. Similarly, some 
countries impose bans on the usage of certain pesticides but others do not. In 
international trade, pesticide bans usually result in zero tolerance if the respective 
substances are found in imported products, and they are thus obviously most 
restrictive. Third, pesticide regulations tend to be regularly adjusted to reflect the 
recent scientific knowledge and detection methods as well as technology advances in 
production methods (good agricultural practises). These dynamics in regulations make 
the comparison of pesticide MRLs a complex task. In particular, comparing the 
requirements over time is often impossible because only information on current MRLs 
is usually available. 
Our case study focuses on the pesticide MRLs for six varieties of fresh fruits in detail: 
apples, cherries, blueberries, grapes, kiwifruit and plums. These fruit varieties on 
average account for about 40% of total agri-food exports from Chile to the EU15 and 
are thus particularly relevant. For each type of fruit, several limits of pesticides/active 
substances apply and the pesticide combinations differ according to variety. The data 
on the pesticide MRLs set by the EU is available from an on-line database provided 
by the EU Commission’s Directorate-General of Health and Consumer Protection (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/sanco _pesticides/public/index.cfm). This EU pesticide database 
contains the MRLs defined in the annexes of Regulation EC/396/2005 and allows to 
search for the MRLs of one or several pesticides for a set of products or to display the 
full list of pesticide MRLs for a given product. A similar database for Chilean 
pesticide MRLs is not available. The information about pesticide MRLs in Chile 
comes from the Extent Resolution No. 581/99. Given the date of the resolution, note 
that the Chilean MRLs are not up-to-date. 
Given the available information, table 1 gives an overview on the pesticide MRLs for 
the selected fruits in Chile and the EU, and the international standards of pesticide 
MRLs by the Codex Alimentarius are also presented. The table refers to the number 
of pesticide MRLs rather than the value of MRLs; the detailed list of MRLs is 
available upon request. As presented, the EU considerably regulates pesticide residues 
in fresh fruits. For each of the fruit varieties looked at, the EU has set a total of 435 
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pesticide MRLs, and they include distinct levels according to fruit variety (specific 
MRLs) as well as levels reflecting the limit of determination (LOD). For those 
pesticide residues which are present in products/groups of products but for which 
MRLs are neither provided at the EU-level nor laid down at the national level of the 
member states, the EU uses default values of the maximum concentration allowed. 
The default values represent the lowest residue concentration that can be detected 
(limit of determination) and are generally set at 0.01 mg/kg (Regulation EC/396/2005, 
Article 18.1b). While being very restrictive, the default values do not necessarily 
constitute import requirements for foreign plant products. Graffham, A. (2006) 
provides an overview of import requirements. 
On average, about 95 of the total number of EU pesticide MRLs are set according to 
the LOD, but it is unclear whether the LOD of the respective pesticides is used for 
health reasons or as a default value when in fact no common EU regulation exists. 
The number of specific MRLs is particularly high for apples and grapes, respectively 
amounting to 128 and 133 pesticide residues actually regulated. With regard to Chile 
and the Codex, the number of pesticide MRLs for apples and grapes is also highest. In 
comparison to the EU, the number of pesticide MRLs set by Chile and the Codex is 
much smaller, and this is also the case if only the EU’s specific MRLs are considered. 
Focusing on specific pesticide MRLs, the EU regulates about 75% more pesticides 
than Chile and about 60% more than the Codex Alimentarius. Note that the mere 
number of MRLs does not give information on the stringency. Considering those 
pesticide residues that are regulated by both the EU and Codex, the values of the EU 
MRLs are smaller than the corresponding Codex value in most cases, indicating that 
the pesticide MRLs in the EU tend to be tighter than the Codex MRLs. While Chile 
usually takes the Codex standards as their own MRLs, the number of pesticide MRLs 
in Chile is slightly smaller than the number of Codex pesticide MRLs, and in few 
cases the pesticide residues allowed in Chile are stricter than the corresponding Codex 
MRLs. 
Table 1: Number of pesticide MRLs for selected fresh fruits*, Jan./Feb. 2009. 
  Chile Codex EU 
Specific MRLs 48 76 128 
LOD  7 307 
Apples 
 
Total 48 83 435 
Specific MRLs 27 55 102 
LOD  3 333 
Cherries 
Total 27 58 435 
Specific MRLs 13 19 61 
LOD  1 374 
Blueberries 
Total 13 20 435 
Specific MRLs 41 66 133 
LOD  2 302 
Grapes 
Total 41 68 435 
Specific MRLs 15 11 48 
LOD  0 387 
Kiwifruit 
Total 15 11 435 
Specific MRLs 24 35 96 
LOD  3 339 
Plums 
Total 24 38 435 
Source: own illustration. 
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3.3. Constructing a heterogeneity index for pesticide MRLs 
In the literature, heterogeneity indices have been constructed for products other than 
agri-food products. For example, Nicoletti et al. (2000) measure the relative 
stringency of standards of manufacturing goods in terms of a summary index. In their 
study, standard requirements are ranked from 0 to 6 (with 0 for the least stringency 
and 6 for the highest) and subsequently summed up to construct an index. Kox and 
Lejour (2005) develop an index for policy heterogeneity in the service sector using a 
binary approach. If a specific item of regulation differs between countries, they 
assigned the value 1, and 0 otherwise. The final index is the average value for the total 
items. This means that if two countries have differences in every item of regulations 
the value of the index is 1, and when all regulations are equal the index is 0. Kox and 
Lejour (2005) hence consider that equal requirements between countries do not 
obstruct trade, and just higher standards requirements in the importer country will act 
as a barrier. While following Kox and Lejour (2005) by averaging the difference of 
individual regulation, we adapt their binary approach to a quantitative approach. That 
is, we construct our index for pesticide MRLs by using the actual difference in MRLs, 
which are different for each pesticide, instead of assigning the value of 1 if 
requirements differ. In order to standardise the indicator, the difference in the MRLs 
is divided by its sum and thus our regulatory heterogeneity indicator aims to reveal 
relative difference in MRLs, The indicator is calculated as follows: 
imp
imp
n MRLnMRLn
MRLnMRLn
r
+
−
=
exp
exp
 (I) 
where rn is the standardized difference in MRLs for pesticide n. MRLnexp and MRLnimp 
are the maximum residue levels in the exporting and importing country, respectively. 
The difference in MRLs is divided by their sum in order to turn the absolute value of 
the difference in a standard value that lies in the interval [-1, 1]. The extreme values 
of -1 and 1 indicate that one of the trading partners bans the respective pesticide. For 
example, if the importer country banned a pesticide (MRL = 0) and if the exporter 
country set an MRL of 5 mg/kg the indicator rn would equal 1, indicating that the 
importer country has the highest level of stringency in that regulation. If the exporter 
country imposed a ban the resulting indicator would be –1, indicating that the level of 
stringency is highest in the exporter country. For rn > 0 the regulation of the importer 
country is more stringent, and for rn < 0 the one of the exporter country is more 
stringent. When both countries impose the same MRLs, the value of the indicator 
becomes 0. Values close to 0 generally mean less stringency while values close to1 
mean more stringency. 
Figure 1 shows the rage of values of the indicator rn and their respective 
interpretation. As highlighted, the stringency indicator for pesticide MRLs has the 
following properties: 
1. The indicator presents a relative value for MRLs of different pesticides and is 
comparable across among pair of trading partner countries.  
2. The indicator can identify which country is more stringent in the regulation. 
Negatives values imply that the exporter country is more stringent, and positive 
value indicates that the more stringent country is the importer country. In absolute 
terms, values close to 0 imply a lower stringency difference between the pairs of 
trading partners, and values close to 1 imply a higher stringency difference. 
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3. The indicator covers the case of equal standard of MRL in pairs of importing and 
exporting countries. 
4. The extreme case when one of the trading partner countries banns respective 
pesticides is covered. If in both countries the pesticide is banned, the indicator can 
not be estimated since the denominator of the expression will be 0. 
Figure 1: Value range of stringency indicator for MRLs. 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Many pesticides are regulated in each country, and the final regulatory heterogeneity 
index Ii for the specific product i is calculated as the average value for all regulated 
pesticide MRLs by the following formula: 
N
r
I
N
n
n
i
∑
=
=
1
 (II) 
where N refers to the number of pesticides included in the index, and nr  gives the 
stringency value in the range of [-1, 1] as described above. 
We apply the regulatory heterogeneity index for pesticide MRLs imposed on fresh 
fruit in trade between Chile and the EU. Using available data sources, we calculate the 
index for the six fruit varieties chosen, whereby Chile is the exporting and the EU15 
is the importing country. Note that we use the list of Chilean pesticide MRLs as our 
starting point. While Chile generally falls back to the Codex standards, considerably 
less pesticides are regulated in Chile and in cases where both the EU and Chile sets 
pesticide MRLs the EU levels are usually more stringent. 
For each of the six fresh fruits, table 2 presents the index of average differences in 
pesticide MRLs for Chile and the EU. The indices calculated reflect that the pesticide 
MRLs in the EU are on average more stringent that in Chile. The differences in the 
stringency of MRLs has a slightly variation across products. While the highest 
difference is observed for blueberries (0.74), the difference is lowest for grapes (0.49). 
As it can be see in table xx, most of the index value are around 0,5. However, note 
that Chile sets more stringent MRLs for some pesticides. For example, the residue 
limits of the substance dithiocarbamates, pirimicarb and parathion-methyl are 
consistently lower in Chile than in the EU standards. Analyzing the information on 
pesticide MRLs by fruit variety, 4 out of the 27 Chilean MRLs for cherries were 
tighter than the EU MRLs. The same applies to 4 out of the 69 Codex MRLs for 
grapes and to 3 out of the 38 Codex MRLs for plums.  
-1 0 1 
Highest stringency 
 for exporter country 
Highest stringency 
 for importer country 
Equal standard 
 between countries  
Exporter country more stringent 
 than importer country 
Importer country more stringent 
 than exporter country 
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Table 2: Index of average differences in pesticide MRLs for selected fruit 
products required by Chile and EU. 
Exported products  Stringency index 
(IChile, EU15) 
Number of pesticides considered 
in the index (N) 
Apples 0.55 48 
Cherries 0.52 27 
Blueberries 0.74 13 
Grapes  0.49 41 
Kiwifruit 0.53 15 
Plums 0.54 24 
Source: own calculation. 
It is important to mention some of the drawbacks of the estimated index. In the case at 
hand, only MRLs regulated in both countries were used for the estimation. The EU 
has a longer list of regulated MRLs than Chile, and thus not all of the EU’s pesticide 
MRLs are reflected. We attempt to capture the most relevant pesticides in our index 
by focusing on the Chilean regulation assuming are more used. Another main 
drawback is that we consider all pesticides to be equally important. Although 
restrictions on pesticide residues do not have the same impact on production, we do 
not account for specific weights in the calculation of the index. In order to improve 
the index some kind of ranking the importance of the respective pesticide MRLs 
would be useful. Since pests and deceases change over time as well as over the areas 
planted, assigning weights for each pesticide MRL turns out to be a difficult task, and 
detailed information on the application of pesticide would be necessary. In our case, 
this could involve surveys on the Chilean producers’ pesticide application which is 
beyond the scope of this report. 
4. Application of the index in the empirical analysis 
4.1. Estimation model 
We use a standard export demand approach to model the impact to the stringency 
index on the volume of trade (Kenan and Rodrik, 1986; Doyle, 2001). As pointed out 
by Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008), export – import demand functions includes a scale 
variable and a relative price term. On the other side, new trade models take into 
account transportation costs and product differentiation as key variables for a good 
performance of the estimation (Neary, 2009). For the estimation of the Chilean export 
supply of selected fruit to the EU, we propose the following model: 
ititittttitit ITERTCRGDPPX εβββββββ +++++++= 6543210  (1) 
where Xit is the export volume of product i from Chile to the EU15 in period t, RGDPt 
is real gross domestic product of the importer used as a proxy of the scale variable, 
income. Pit is the real FOB price of the exported product i, and ERt is the exchange 
rate between the importer and exporter country. Both variables are considered as 
relative price terms. The variable Tit represents the tariffs that the importing country 
imposes on product i in period t, and TCt is transportation cost, measured in this case 
as the oil price in period t, since we are only dealing with two countries. The 
regulatory heterogeneity index is denoted Iit. The index included in the model is the 
one estimated in the previous section. Note that our index is fixed over time because 
only updated information on MRLs is readily available to calculate the index.  
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The model presented is a panel data (or pooled data) model, where the regression 
equation uses both a temporal and a cross-sectional dimension. In our case, the 
temporal dimension is a period of time of 12 years (1996 to 2007) and the cross 
sectional dimension is given by the six fresh fruits included in the analysis. For such 
panel models, two alternative estimation methods are considered: a fixed effect 
estimation among the groups of observations, in our case among the six fruit products, 
and a random effect model estimation which implies a particular stochastic term in 
each group beside the traditional error term. For the case at hand, a random effect 
model is chosen since we do not expect fixed differences in the Chilean export 
demand to EU for fresh fruits. Instead, each particular fruit variety can be expected to 
be subject to specific influences (e.g. nutrition, season, holidays, etc.). The following 
equation is estimated as a random effect model: 
itiiittttitit ITERTCRGDPPX εµβββββββ ++++++++= 6543210  (2) 
where iµ  is the random term that is assumed to be normally distributed with ),0( 2σN  
and uncorrelated with the error term itε . 
Except for the explanatory variables Ii,, equation (2) is transformed into natural logs 
and estimated for Chile as the exporting country and the EU15 as the importing 
country. The trade data between Chile and the EU15 are annual time series between 
1996 and 2007 (12 years). The panel is constructed using trade variables (volume of 
trade and unit value) for: blueberries (HS6 code: 081040), kiwifruit (081050), cherries 
(080920), plums (080940), grapes (080610) and apples (080810). Table A2 in the 
appendix gives the detailed summary description of the variables in the model and the 
corresponding data sources used. 
The model was estimated in the software NLogit 4.0.  
4.2. Estimation results and discussion 
Looking at the data set reveals that some of the explanatory variables included in the 
model are highly correlated, and therefore would cause co-linearity problems in the 
model. Table 3A in the appendix presents the correlation coefficients. As shown, the 
real GDP, the exchange rate and the oil price are particularly high correlated and we 
therefore decided to eliminate two of the three variables for the estimation. 
In order to decide on the variables to incorporate in the model, we estimate the full 
model and check the significance of each of the three variables. Since the exchange 
rate (ER) has the highest level of significance, we incorporate it in the final model, 
while leaving the other variables out. Table 3 presents the results of the corresponding 
estimation. 
According to the results, the estimated model has a good performance and most of the 
variables are significant in the model. The R2 is 0.82 and thus indicates that the model 
fits well. According to the Lagrange Multiplier Test, the random effect model is 
preferred to the fix effect model. 
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Table 3: Estimation results of the EU15 import demand model for selected 
Chilean fresh fruits, random effect model estimation. 
Variable Coefficient Estimated Coefficient t- value P(t > tc) 
Constant β0 5.58** 2.09 0.04 
Ln itP  β1 -0.80*** -3.07 0.002 
Ln tER  β4 1.87*** 5.87 <0.0001 
itT  β5 -0.008 -0.14 0.88 
iI  β6 -14.84*** -4.5 <0.0001 
R2 = 0.82 
*significant at 10% confidence, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
Source: own estimation. 
The coefficient associated to the product price (LnP) is highly significant and has a 
negative sign, as expected. A price increase reduces export demand. Since the 
variables are expressed in natural logarithm the interpretation of the coefficient is the 
price elasticity measure, and we can state that a 10% increase in the price implies a 
decrease in the trade volume by 8%. The effect of the exchange rate is positive, 
significant and highly elastic. The value of the coefficient indicates that a 10% 
increase of the real exchange rate between Peso and Euro leads to a 18,7% increase in 
the trade volume. As expected, the estimated coefficient of the exchange rate indicates 
that a depreciation of the Peso against the Euro reduces the landing price of Chilean 
fruit in the EU, thereby resulting in increased exports from Chile. The coefficient 
shows that the exchange rate is more sensitive than the price, meaning that the 
exchange rate has a higher impact on the exporters’ returns than price. While having 
the expected sign, the tariff reduction coefficient is not significant. 
The regulatory heterogeneity index variable (I) returned significant and with the 
expected negative sign on the coefficient. If MRLs in the EU are more stringent than 
the corresponding MRLs in Chile the index is positive and the impact on exported 
volume is negative. To understand the magnitude of the impact of the regulatory 
heterogeneity index we use the index elasticity that is reported for each of the six 
fruits in table 4. As shown, exports are highly sensitive to changes in the index and 
there are only minor differences in elasticities across the different fruit types. 
Table 4. Elasticity of exports to the index value for selected Chilean fresh fruits 
exported to EU(15). 
Type of fruit Index elasticity Estimated impact on trade volume, 
5% increase of the stringency index 
Apples 8.16 40.8% 
Cherries 7.72 38.6% 
Blueberries 10.98 54.9% 
Grapes  7.27 36.4% 
Kiwifruit 7.87 39.3% 
Plums 8.01 40.1% 
Source: own calculation  
Obviously, the sensitivity of exports to changes in the underlying MRL regulations is 
most interesting. An example is useful here. Let us assume that the EU reduces the 
regulatory tolerance level for each of the 48 MRLs in apples trade by 5%. Under this 
scenario the regulatory heterogeneity index takes the value of 0,56, an increase of 
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1,8% (see table 5) Multiplied by the elasticity of apple exports to a change in the 
index, this results in a decrease of the export volume by 14.8%. We observe no 
differences in export volume across products to a change in MRLs, with the exception 
of grapes that are twice as sensitive than the other products. 
Table 5: Simulation of the trade impact following a 5% decrease of the 
regulatory tolerance level for EU MRLs. 
Type of fruit  Index after 5% 
reduction in all MRLs 
% change in index % change in trade 
volume 
Apples 0.56 1.8% -14.8% 
Cherries 0.53 1.9% -14.8% 
Blueberries 0.75 1.4% -14.8% 
Grapes  0.51 4.1% -29.7% 
Kiwifruit 0.54 1.9% -14.8% 
Plums 0.55 1.9% -14.8% 
Source: own calculation  
The first thing that raises the attention regarding the expected impact of the regulatory 
heterogeneity index is the high value of the elasticity and therefore its impact on trade 
volume. However, it needs to be noticed that as the index is composed by many 
different pesticides is not very sensitive in value. As the example shows, if all 
pesticide MRLs were increased by 5% trade of most of the fruits would change by 
around 15%. 
5. Conclusion 
An assessment of the trade impact of SPS requirements is first and foremost an 
empirical issue, and we argue that the relative differences of SPS regulations trigger 
the impact on trade flows between trading partner countries. In this paper we have 
identified the scope of possible regulatory differences that may affect agri-food trade, 
and found that it is a considerable challenge to bring this scope into a quantification 
framework. In order to capture the relative differences, we apply an index of 
regulatory heterogeneity for the case study of trade in selected fruit products between 
Chile and the EU. 
Existing approaches designed to incorporate a regulatory comparison in trade into a 
quantification framework appeared unsatisfactory in particular with regard to the use 
of binary data on standards and regulations. A simple yet innovative indicator 
designed for the purpose of comparison regulations on MRLs was more satisfying in 
that respect because it summarized two relevant types of information: the relative 
differences in regulation and the information on the most stringent trade partner. In 
comparison to the existing indices of policy heterogeneity, however, the depth of 
information generated by our index severely compromised its coverage. Future work 
will need to address greater coverage, in particular with regard to market approval 
requirements, process standards and conformity assessment procedures. 
While our heterogeneity index improves on the current state of the art in quantifying 
the trade impact of SPS regulations, the obtained insights about the distinct impact of 
regulatory requirements are particularly useful in the light of cooperation on standards 
within trade agreements, such as the EU-Chile Association Agreement that aims at 
reducing possible trade impediments due to differences in SPS regulations. 
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 Table A1: Categories of SPS requirements. 
Product standards 
Labeling Labeling is any written, electronic, or graphic communication on the 
consumer packaging or on a separate but associated label. 
Marketing Measures defining the information that the transport/distribution 
packaging of goods should carry, which are directly related to food 
safety. 
Packaging Measures regulating the mode in which goods must or cannot be 
packed and defining the packaging materials to be used, which is 
directly related to food safety. 
Maximum levels of 
residues, contaminants and 
other ingredients 
Maximum concentration level of residue and other substances (MRLs) 
permitted, which enter the product during the production and/or 
distribution processes, or restriction on the use of certain substances as 
ingredients 
Process standards 
General hygienic 
requirements 
Restrictions to avoid the contamination by microorganisms/parasites in 
foods/feeds that cover production, manufacturing, transport and storage 
conditions. 
Process regulation for plant 
production 
e.g. post-harvest treatment and pathogen controls 
Process regulations for 
animal production  
e.g. food safety and quality management, including the requirement to 
inform about the processing history at all stages of animal production 
Conformity assessment requirements 
Certification  Certification issued by governmental agencies or third parties either in 
the importing or exporting country; possible requirement of translating 
certificates in the language of the importing country. 
Testing requirements  Sampling requirements usually associated with testing or laboratory 
fees, both in the exporting country or at customs 
Inspection requirements Inspection of products either by public or private entities, including 
border inspection 
Registration requirements  Importers may need to be registered in the importing country (pre-
listing) or exporters may need to contact a registered importer. 
Quarantine requirements Quarantine for imports during a certain period. 
Source: own illustration based on new TRAINS classification (available under http://ntb.unctad.org/about.aspx). 
  
Table A2: Model variables and data sources. 
Variable Description Source 
itX   Export volume for each fruit product, 
measured in tons per year. 
Trade database by the Chilean Studies and 
Agrarian Policies Bureau 
itP  Real unit value at FOB prices of traded products in dollars per ton. It is calculated 
as total exported value in current dollars 
divided by exported volume. This result 
is transformed in real terms using Chilean 
CPI. 
Total export value: trade database of the 
Chilean Studies and Agrarian Policies 
Bureau 
Chilean CPI: Central Bank of Chile 
tRGDP  Real gross domestic product for EU. The 
nominal GDP is deflated using the EU 
consumer price index (CPI). 
Annual GDP in current prices and CPI: 
Eurostat. 
tTC  Real oil prices in dollar per barrel. The 
current prices are transformed into real 
prices using Chilean CPI.  
Statistical database of the Energy 
Information Administration. 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtot
worldw.htm) 
tER  Real exchange rate between Chile and the EU calculated by using the respective 
dollar exchange rates for Chile and the 
EU. The ratio of exchange rates is 
transformed in real terms by using the 
corresponding consumer price indices as 
follows:  
Ch
EU
EU
Ch
CPI
CPI
ER
ERER ⋅=  
The real exchange rate for Chile (ERCh) is 
obtained from the Central Bank of Chile, 
and the real exchange rate for the EU 
(EREU) is obtained from the Federal 
Reserve database: 
(www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/) 
itT  Annual trade-weighted import tariff 
applied to each fruit including ad valorem 
equivalents of specific tariffs. The 
weights are computed from HS8 digit 
import values in the Eurostat/COMEXT 
database  
Tariff information was generated for 
multiple years from the Trade Related 
Information System (TRAINS) of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, 
accessed via the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) 
Ii Regulatory heterogeneity index for 
pesticide MRLs 
Calculated as described in 3.2. 
 
Table 3A: Correlation coefficients among explanatory variables.  
 P RGDP TC ER T F 
P 1 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.51 
RGDP  1 0.77 0.87 -0.29 0.00 
TC   1 0.63 -0.36 0.00 
ER    1 -0.19 0.00 
T     1 0.17 
F      1 
Source: own estimation. 
 
